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DUNS SCOTUS ON THE GOODNESS OF GOD I
Marilyn McCord Adams

Over the past thirty years. analytical philosophers of religion have confronted the problem
of evil in the guise of the atheistic argument from evil against the existence of God.
Many have met it from the posture of defense, constructing logically possible morally
sufficient reasons for divine permission of evils from the materials of religion-neutral
value-theory. At best, such defenses vindicate divine goodness along the dimension
"producer of global goods," while neglecting the religiously more relevant dimension of
His goodness to individual suffering creatures. My methodological recommendation is
that we Christian philosophers shift away from defense and concentrate on formulating
what we really believe about the goodness of God and how He is solving the problem
of evil. If successful, our accounts would not only exhibit how divine permission of evils
is logically consistent with His goodness to creatures, but also advertise Him as a character
worthy of worship. Failures would pinpoint more precisely where and how evil is a
problem for us. 1 illustrate this method by examining Duns Scotus' many-faceted conception of divine goodness and measure its power to explain the compossibility of God and evil.

Over the last thirty years or so, we analytic philosophers of religion have tended
to grapple with the religious problem of suffering under the guise of the so-called
"logical" argument from evil for atheism: viz., that since it is logically impossible
that an essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God coexist with
evil, God must not exist because evil plainly does. Many of us have agreed that
solutions (if any) must take the form of generating logically possible morally
sufficient reasons that even a perfect being might have for not preventing or
eliminating evils in the amounts and the kinds found in the actual world.
Moreover, many of us have conducted our search for such divine excuses from
the posture of defense, seeking to undermine the charge of inconsistency by
appeal to value-premisses that the atheistic arguer qua atheist might accept (or
at least could not conclusively discredit) rather than to doctrinal claims peculiar
to believers. If our defense is from the Best of All Possible Worlds, we invoke
G. E. Moore's notion of organic unity to suggest (via Leibniz) how a craftsman
may be morally permitted to include negatively valued parts as necessary constituents of (means to) a whole greater in value than any whole entirely lacking
in negatively valued parts. We then mount an appeal to ignorance, that for all
we know, the Best of All Possible Worlds contains evils in the amounts and of
the kinds found in this world; and conclude that the atheist is not entitled to his
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charge of incompatibility. 2 If we prefer the Free Will Defense, we commend a
world with a favorable balance of moral good over moral evil as a logically
possible and morally permissible divine goal, maintain that moral responsibility
presupposes freedom, contend that not even an omnipotent God could ensure a
world including free creatures but no evils, and conclude as before that the
atheistic arguer has not made out his case. 3
Whatever the merits of such defenses, they have the defect of leading us away
from the religious question that gives rise to the atheistic argument in the first
place: viz., whether and how, in view of sufferings many and great, God (if He
exists) could be good enough to suffering creatures to warrant their love and
trust. Portraying God as a possible producer of such global goods as the Best
of All Possible Worlds, or a world containing free creatures or a favorable
balance of moral virtue over moral vice or a perfect order of retributive justice,
may vindicate divine character along one dimension of goodness, but it fails to
confront the issue of His agent-centered goodness. Yet, as Ivan Karamazov's
speeches eloquently show, God's worthiness of worship (of whole-hearted love
and unreserved trust) cannot be adequately defended apart from His goodness
in th islatter respect.
For my part, I would like to suggest a methodological change of pace. What
if some of us Christian philosophers shifted off the project of defense and tried
to articulate what we actually believe about God's goodness and how He is
solving the problem of evil? Christian metaphysics would examine the goodness
of God as He is in Himself, while soteriology would chart how God is being
good to created persons. Our attempted formulations would then be measured
for adequacy against both the canons of consistency and the convictions of the
wider Christian community. Failures would pinpoint more precisely where and
how evil is a problem for believers; and Faith seeking Understanding would send
us in pursuit, with both heart and philosophical mind, of a more profound grasp
of the mysterious goodness of God. To the extent that we succeed, our solutions
might not only exhibit the compossibility of God and evil, but also commend
God as a character worthy of worship. If the atheistic arguer could not share
our value theory, he might at least gain a better understanding of our position
or even come to appreciate how reasonable people could find it attractive!
Although my purpose is methodological, my approach is historical. To illustrate
my proposal, I shall begin by reviewing Duns Scotus' many-faceted conception
of divine goodness. I choose Scotus because he is perhaps less known than
others, and because his picture of God's creative and redemptive purpose is
novel and stimulating. 5 As we shall see, his resultant theology is not immune to
the problem of evil. But our investigation will re-identify its location in the light
of Christian soteriology.
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1. God's Metaphysical Goodness and Divine Justice:

Scotus distinguishes among metaphysical or natural, moral, and supernatural
or meritorious goodness. The interaction of his philosophical and theological
value intuitions yields a modified naturalism to which he appeals in showing
how an appreciation of God's metaphysical goodness delineates the obligations
of justice for rational free agents, created and divine.
Scotus believes that he can demonstrate a priori the existence of an infinite
being, which is the first efficient cause and ultimate end of everything else, the
most eminent being, and one which acts by intellect and will. 6 As dependent,
any other being is finite. Following ancient Greek value-theory, Scotus assumes
that in a transcendental sense, 'being' and 'good' convert (art truly predicable
of all and only the same things), the latter signifying being under the aspect of
desirability or amiability; while natural goodness pertains to the perfection of a
thing (e.g., a blind man has transcendental goodness, but is defective in natural
goodness because humans are normally sighted).7 Both the transcendental and
natural goodness of a thing are proportionate to its degree of being. 8 The infinite
being is the infinite good and infinitely desirable or lovable; finite beings are
only finite goods, only finitely desirable or lovable.
Ancient naturalists in value-theory held that the metaphysical or natural goodness of a thing imposed a moral obligation on agents to love it. According to
them, the moral goodness of an agent consists in following what its right reason
dictates, and right reason would surely judge that a thing is to be loved in
proportion to its amiability. The logical outcome of such naturalism would
seemingly be that an agent's obligation to love a thing is directly proportionate
to that thing's degree of being, so that one ought to love better beings more than
lesser ones--e.g., angels more than humans, dogs more than rocks.
Scotus does not fully agree. Apparently, he reckons that since the infinite
good is incommensurate with any finite good (or collection of finite goods),
there could be no good reason for not loving the infinite good above all and for
its own sake. Hence, right reason would dictate universally to any agent, that
"the best ought to be loved the most."9 Since not all finite goods are mutually
compatible, there can always be a reason against loving any finite good. Hence,
there is no unconditional obligation for any agent to love any finite good.
It follows that "God is no debtor in any unqualified sense save with respect
to His own goodness, namely, that He love it"l0 and "there is no justice in God
except that which inclines Him to render to His own goodness what is its due. " I I
Indeed,
"there is nothing in the divine will that inclines it specifically to any
secondary object in such a way that it would be impossible for it justly
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to incline to its opposite. For without contradiction, the will could will
the opposite, and thus it could justly will such; otherwise it could will
something absolutely and not do so justly, which seems incongruous. "12
Since God owes it to Himself to be of consistent purpose in creation,
" ... where creatures are concerned, He is a debtor rather to His own
generosity, in the sense that He gives creatures what their nature
demands, which exigency in them is set down as something just, a kind
of secondary object of justice, as it were ... "13
Scotus interprets this secondary obligation liberally, however, not as one to do
what befits this or that particular creature, but to establish an appropriate order
on the totality of things. 14 And Scotus seems to imply that God can establish a
fitting order on any collection of possible created things He chooses or allows
to be actualized. 15
Likewise, it follows from Scotus' modified naturalism that rational free creatures (if any) have an obligation to love God above all. 16 Thus, he writes,
"that I should love God above all" "can be inferred demonstratively in
the following fashion. 'God is that greater than which nothing can be
thought; therefore he is supremely lovable; therefore I ought to love
Him above all'. "17
Accordingly, not even God can dispense anyone from this obligation. IX From
the obligation to love God above all, there follows another: "free will is obliged
to elicit every act in conformity with a superior rule-viz., according to divine
precept. "19
Thus far, Scotus thinks, a priori philosophizing will take us. God's infinite
metaphysical or natural goodness imposes an obligation on Him and on creatures
to love Him above all (to place Him first in the preference ranking and to love
Him with greater intensity). But the finite natural goodness of creatures implies
that God owes nothing to creatures and will not be unjust to any creature no
matter what He does. Nor will He be unjust to Himself in creation provided He
satisfies the minimal condition of establishing a fitting order on the whole collection of created things.
2. The Generosity of Divine Purpose:
For Scotus, a priori reasoning demonstrates, from God's metaphysical goodness, that perfect justice puts God under no obligations to creatures; but it is
Christian soteriology that reveals God as a maximally organized lover of them. 20
Moreover, Scotus' novel reading of tradition serves to magnify God's love and
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generosity towards His elect.
(2.1) Divine Love in Search of eo-Lovers: Scotus believes he can demonstrate
(see section 1) that God loves Himself above all with friendship love (amor
amicitiae)-that is, with a love that values the good for its own sake and not
merely as a means to some other end. 21 Such love for a good is non-possessive,
and expresses itself in part in the will that the good in question be loved the
same way by others. Yet, insofar as loving that good is advantageous for the
lover, the will that there should be co-lovers is an expression of love for the
prospective co-lovers as well. The persons of the Trinity love the divine essence
and each other with such friendship-love. That this love of the infinite good
should be shared by still others is, for Scotus, God's principal motive in creation.
Among possible creatures, only free agents could be elevated to share such
friendship-love for God. To be sure, every possible being has a natural inclination
or tendency for its own proper perfection. 22 But such an inclination would move
a being towards God, only insofar as God was a means to or contributed towards
its own proper perfection, and would not be towards God for His own sake. It
is the ultimate differentia of rational free creatures that they have a double
motivational drive: natural appetite, or affectio commodi, which is an inclination
for its own advantage as perceived by its own intellect (perfected by hope), and
affectio iustitiae, or the inclination for intrinsic goods for their own sake (perfected
by charity). 23 The will of free creatures is, according to Scotus, a self-determining
power for opposites that determines whether the free agent acts in accordance
with the inclination for what is advantageous or the inclination for justice. It is
only because such creatures share with God an inclination for justice, to love
things for their own sake as they deserve to be loved, that they are minimally
suited to be co-lovers of God.
Since God is not under any obligation, whether to Himself or to possible
creatures, to give them real existence, His making free creatures whose obligation
it is to love God above all, is a first act of generosity. But divine liberality goes
further in its desire to raise such persons above their natural possibilities by
granting them the beatific vision and such steadfastness of friendship love for
God as would be sufficient for created happiness. 24 Thus, Scotus joins the
medieval consensus that God who has no obligation to create anything and no
obligation to creatures to do one thing rather than another in relation to them,
in being true to Himself generously wills that finite and temporal persons be
raised to the incommensurate good of face to fact loving intimacy with the
infinite and eternal God. Of such surprising generosity, Scotus writes,
" ... Not only does God's infinite goodness or His nature as this unique
nature in its uniqueness draw us to love such, but because 'Goodness'
loves me, sharing itself with me, therefore I elicit an act of love towards
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(2.2) The Structure of God's Intentions in Creation: Scotus' theological originality shows in his detailed articulation of God's purpose. Even though there
is no temporal succession in God's deliberation and willing, but He wills whatever
He wills immutably in the now of eternity, nevertheless, Scotus thinks it is
possible to distinguish a logical order within His purpose, a natural priority and
posteriority, and so to locate the willing of different objects at different "instants
of nature."
Since God is the most well-organized of lovers, God wills first the end and
then the proximate and remote means to that end. 2" According to Scotus, (a)
God's end in creation is for created persons to share with the Trinity in the
intimate friendship-love of God above all. Within this end, however, the primary
finite object of divine love is the rational soul of Christ. According to Scotus'
daring conception, God so loved the rational soul of Christ that He wanted to
create it and be intimately loved by it whether or not any other creatures existed. 27
Happily for us, however, God has willed that Christ should be the head of many
co-lovers,28 whose number includes angels and other human souls. 29
(b) Second, God wills the proximate means to that end. Since the end raises
created persons above what is naturally possible or required for them, something
must be done to fit them for such intimacy with the eternal Trinity. Where Christ
is concerned, his human soul is fitted for the intimacy of the beatific vision by
hypostatic union with the Divine Word. Sometimes Scotus explains this by saying
that it wasfitting for what subsisted in the Word to be raised to a higher glory
than is appropriate to a pure creature. '11 Other times, Scotus evidences the pull
of ancient naturalism, which insists that better beings should be loved more,
when he says that hypostatic union makes it fitting for God to love the soul of
Christ more than an angel. 31 Thus, the union of intimate love is given a metaphysical ground in the hypostatic union. 32 Further, the soul of Christ is confirmed in
beatitude from the first instant of its creation; as steadfast in its friendship-love
of God above all, that soul is impeccable. 3l
Angels and other human souls are fitted for sharing the divine love life by
infused grace. God freely and contingently legislates a system of merit which
creates conventional and statutory connections between the finite and temporal
acts and states of created persons on the one hand, and divine acceptance, infused
grace, and eternal glory on the other. Thus, the finite and temporal acts and
states of created persons are given eternal significance.
(c) Third, God wills the remote means to His end. Scotus notes, "God is said
to do what is right in a creature from the way He makes one created thing
correspond to another ... because the created nature demands this as something
suited to it. "34 Human rational souls are incomplete beings and are naturally
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metaphysical constituents of rational animals. Thus, it was fitting for God to
produce the physical world, so that the rational souls of men could be fittingly
joined to bodies. On this construal, Scotus approves Aristotle's claim that man
is the end for the sake of which the physical world exists. 35
(2.3) Evil as "Occasional": Notice that Scotus' charter of God's principal
ends in creation and the proximate and remote means thereto ignores evils
completely. This is deliberate. So far as the origin of evil is concerned, Scotus
adopts what is known nowadays as a "free will defense." According to him, "all
goods are attributed to God and all evils to us. "36 Rational free creatures and
hence the possibility of sin are necessary for God's primary objective-the
community of co-lovers, created as well as divine. But, pace Leibniz, actual sin
is not a logically (metaphysically) necessary constituent of the Best of All Possible
World. Nor, pace Aquinas, is actual sin required for the manifestation of divine
goodness-so that God may show Himself just in punishing and merciful in
sparing sinners.37 Actual sin is not a logically (metaphysically) necessary means
to, or a logically (metaphysically) or even naturally necessary consequence of
God's principally intended end. Neither is the evil resulting from sin's punishment. 38 To make clear just how marginal evils are to the divine purpose, Scotus
examines the natural priorities of God's will in more detail.
(2.3.1) Predestination and Sin: Against the current of theological opinion,
Scotus declares that neither the Incarnation or the predestination of Christ-any
more than the predestination of anyone else-was dependent upon sin or
occasioned by prior guilt. 39 "Before any merit and before any demerit, He intends
Christ to be united to Himself in the unity of the supposit"; otherwise, it would
follow that God's highest work-viz., Christ-was occasioned by sin, which
would show bad priorities and belie the claim that God is the most well-organized
of lovers.4o Rather,
"First, God desires Himself; second He desires Himself in others; third,
He wills that He be desired by one who can love Him in the highest
degree that he can be loved by someone external; fourth, He intends
the union of the nature which ought to love Him in the highest degree
even if no one fell. "41
As before, Scotus insists that according to God's actual priorities, the predestination of the soul of Christ follows only God's self-love and general desire for
created co-lovers; the Incarnation is a suitable means to that end.
Likewise, for other free creatures, God predestines or not at an instant of
nature prior to any foreseen sin. Scotus outlines the sequence as follows (where
n I, n2, ... stand for instants of nature; Michael and Lucifer are angels, and
Peter and Judas, the disciples of those names):
nl: Michael and Lucifer, Peter and Judas are represented to God
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as alike in natural features;
God wills glory for Michael and Peter,
and elicits no positive act regarding Lucifer and Judas.
112: God wills grace-faith, merits, and a good use of free willfor Michael and Peter,
and elicits no positive act regarding Lucifer and Judas.
n4: God wills to permit Michael and Lucifer, Peter and Judas to
sin (and therefore wills not to obstruct their exercise of
free choice so as to eliminate the possibility of sin)
n5: Lucifer and Judas are presented to God as ones who will commit
the sin of final impenitence
and God justly punishes or reprobates Lucifer and Judas:'
According to Scotus' theology, predestination is naturally prior to and not determined by foreseen free choice, because it raises the created person to a destiny
not possible for him by nature alone; but reprobation is naturally simultaneous
with foreseen sin, because "God is not a punisher before man is a debtor. "43
Again, "the complete foreordination and predestination of the elect is prior to
anything being actually done about the reprobate, lest anyone should rejoice at
the fall of another. "44 Elect human souls were not-pace Anselm--created and
elevated to take the places forfeited by fallen angels.
(2.:1 .2) God's Response to Sin,' In his effort to dissociate God from the entrance
of evil into the universe, Scotus represents God's planning as ignoring sin until
the last possible moment. His reasoning hints at a tacit reliance on the following
controversial principles:
(P I) an agent is responsible for his principally intended ends and the
(proximate and remote) ;means thereto in a way in which he is
not responsible for the side-effects occasioned thereby
and
(P2) an agent is more responsible for his positive acts and their
quences than for his omissions and their consequences.

con~;e-

On Scotus' account (see section I), however, God's only responsibilities are to
Himself. And whatever may be said about (PI) in general, God's truth to Himself
would mean not only choosing appropriate (proximate and remote) means to His
ends, but also effecting a fitting integration of the unintended side-effects into
His over-all purposes. Likewise, whether or not (P2) holds for created agents,
surely the omniscient, omnipotent, and maximally organized lover would not be
true to Himself were He to let His goals be obstructed by simple and avoidable
omissions.
Scotus can consistently claim that God's justice survives His permission of
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sin, only if God can work sin and its (logically/metaphysically or naturally)
necessary consequences into a providential order that allows Him to achieve the
generous aims Scotus ascribes to Him. This He docs, Scotus thinks, by redeeming
the elect45 and punishing sin.46 Moreover, God's choice among possible redemptive strategies amplifies His love for the elect by joining the generosity of (the
human soul of) Christ to that of God Himself and allowing the best beloved to
serve the less favored.
(2.3.3) Redemption of the Elect from Sin: Scotus' doctrine of the atonement
is one of the most innovative pieces of his theology and affords a striking contrast
to that of his eminent predecessor, St. Anselm. Both agree (i) that since God is
a being a greater than which cannot be thought He is infinitely worthy of honor
and love; (ii) that God's principal purpose in creation is to have created co-lovers
who will be made happy thereby; (iii) that God's purpose is primafacie obstructed
by sin; (iv) that the standards of divine justice are somehow prior to divine
choice; and (v) that these standards of justice require God to be of consistent
purpose and not let created persons decisively obstruct His plans.
In Cur Deus Homo, however, Anselm begins by conceding a premiss to which
Scotus is fundamentally opposed-evil that it would be unfitting for the highest
possible nature to join itself to a finite and temporal creature in hypostatic union
apart from some necessary reason-and goes on to argue that the Incarnation
was the only possible way for God to accomplish His original purpose in creation,
given the fact of human sin. Anselm's argument seems to assume; (vii) that
these standards require satisfaction for an offense against the supreme nature;
and (viii) that this satisfaction must be proportionate to the worthiness of the
offended party. Since (ix) worthiness is proportionate to degree of being (see
section 1 above), it follows by (i) and (viii) that any offense against God is
infinitely culpable. Likewise, by (ix), it follows that no created act could be
infinitely meritorious. Therefore, only God could do something meritorious
enough to make satisfaction for sin against God. Further, Anselm contends, even
if an angel could do something infinitely meritorious, it would be unfitting for
the human debt to be paid by a created person not of Adam's race. For fallen
humans would then be obliged in the first instance to their created benefactor
rather than to God. Relying on a principle of collective responsibility, Anselm
concludes, that the debt will be fittingly paid only by a member of Adam's
indebted race. Hence a God-man, who was both able to pay and a member of
the race that ought to pay, was necessary.
Scotus begins his critique of Anselm by taking issue with (vii) and (viii), the
assumption that in the redemptive order matters of fittingness are determined by
standards of justice independent of the divine will. Rather, just as nothing about
angelic or human natures could make created persons fit for the beatific vision
by their very natures, but rather they are predestined to it by a free and contingent
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divine volition; so no created act or state is, by its very nature, acceptable or
meritorious, but is so only by freely instituted divine statutes. Thus, Scotus
writes, "every created offering holds good only to the extent that God accepts
it and not more"4' and something counts as "merit because accepted, but not
vice versa."48 A fortiori, which (if any) created act counts as satisfaction for sin
is a matter of God's free and contingent volition.
It follows, contrary to (viii), that God is not obliged to demand an offering
that is ontologically commensurate with His nature. This is a good thing, too,
because, if He were, not even an Incarnation would meet the Anselmian requirements of justice. For if it is a member of Adam's race who must pay, Scotus
reasons, then the acts of redemptive significance would be those of the human
soul of Christ, not those of the divine will. Yet, all of the acts of Christ's human
soul are finite and ontologically incommensurate with the divine essence. Hypostatic union does not change the acts of a human soul from finite to infinite. 49
Thus, God would be free to accept as satisfaction a formally finite act by
which the sinful creature himself loves God more intensely than he formerly
loved the created object in preference to God. 50 God willing,
" ... if Adam, through the gifts of grace and charity, had one or many
acts of loving God for His own sake by a greater force of free will than
was the force of sinning, such love would have sufficed for remitting
his sin and could have made satisfaction ... "51
Likewise, God could accept such an act of love from a good angel or from
another mere man conceived without sin and graced by God. 52 Nor, contrary to
Anselm, would this mean that redeemed humans were obliged to their created
benefactor rather than to God, but "to God alone because all he [i.e., the created
benefactor] had would have been from God."53 And it would be only by virtue
of contingent divine legislation that his finite act counted as meritorious enough
for redemption. In sum, we are "always, finally, and maximally obliged to God
as to the one from whom all goods proceed. "54
On Scotus' account, God's actual redemptive strategy explodes the Anselmian
assumption-that where possible God respects the ontological proprieties, that
the lower and less worthy should serve the higher and more admirable (i.e., that
he abides by (vii), (viii), and (ix))-at a still deeper level. For where God-who
is entitled to set the rules for redemption any way He wishes--could have chosen
any created person as redeemer, He in fact elected, with the generous cooperation
of the soul of Christ, the created being He loves most, so that the higher serves
the lower. Again, although there was no metaphysical necessity for God to cast
any of the divine persons as characters in the redemptive plot, God preferred to
enter the action Himself and chose that human soul to which the Divine Word
was already intimately united in hypostatic union. And, Scotus would contend,
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it is precisely in making such choices that God shows consistency of purpose
(and hence manifests His justice): the creator who takes the initiative to join
finite and temporal persons to the infinite and eternal in beatific vision and love
of God, also is joined in hypostatic union to the human soul whose finite and
temporal acts He accepts for the world's redemption.
According to God's actual scenario, the human soul of Christ chooses to
participate in divine judgment by confronting the religious leaders of His community with their sin.
". . . Thus, it should be believed that that man suffered for the sake of
justice. For he saw the evils of the Jews which they did and how by
disordered and distorted affection they were attracted to their law. They
did not even permit men to be healed on the Sabbath, and yet they drew
out a sheep or cow from the pit on the Sabbath, and many others.
Therefore. Christ, wishing to caJl them back from that error through
deeds and words, preferred to die rather than to be silent, since truth
needed to be spoken to the Jews. Therefore, He died for justice ... "55

In this, Christ was obedient to God's call and purpose for Him. But with loving
generosity for His fellows, He wished to turn the passion, which sin rejecting
judgment effected, for a redemptive purpose.
" ... Nevertheless, in fact His [i.e., Christ's 1grace ordained His passion
and offered it to the Father for us. Therefore, we are very much obliged
to Him. For by the fact that man could have been redeemed otherwise
and yet by His free will He redeemed us this way, we are very much
obliged to Him and more so than if He had done so necessarily and we
could not have been redeemed another way. Therefore, for the sake of
attracting us to His love, as I believe, He chiefly did this, and because
He wished man to be bound more fully to God. For example. if someone
had begotten the first man and afterwards instructed him in discipline
and sanctity, he would have been more obliged to him than if he had
only begotten him and someone else had instructed him. This is fittingness, not necessity. "56
God, contemplating His response to sin in the now of eternity, sees Christ's
obedience, His passion, and His generous offer, and freely and contingently
decides to accept it, thereby electing Him redeemer of the world. In order for
Christ to play this dual role, as head of the community of co-lovers and as
redeemer of Adam's race, He must have a flesh that is able to suffer. Therefore,
although apart from sin and in accord with His first role, Christ would have
been endowed with a glorified body from the beginning,57 the latter glory was
delayed so that He might fill the role of mediator by suffering the passion. 58
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Scotus summarizes his account of God's redemptive plans in the following
passage:
'This, then, was the order of divine intentions: (i) first God understood
Himself under the aspect of the highest good; (ii) in the second sign,
He understood all others, creatures; (iii) in the third, He predestined to
glory and grace, and concerning the others He had a negative act by
not predestining them; (iv) in the fourth, He foresees those who will
fall away in Adam; (v) in the fifth, He foreordained or intended the
remedy-how they would be redeemed through the passion of His Son.
Thus, Christ in the f1esh, like all the other elect, was intended and
predestined to grace and glory, prior to His intending the passion of
Christ as medicine against the fall, the way a doctor wills a man's health
prior to ordering healing medicine.
"Moreover, just as the elect were predestined prior to His intending
the passion of Christ as a remedy against their fall, so the whole Trinity
ordained the predestinate and elect to grace and final glory, so far as
efficient [causality] is concerned, prior to intending the passion of Christ
as medicine to be taken for the elect who fall in Adam, already predestined to final glory. And just as the Word intends His passion to be
offered to the Father for the predestined and elect, and so efficaciously
offered it in effect, so the whole Trinity efficaciously accepted the
passion for them, and it was efficaciously offered for no others or
accepted from eternity. Therefore, He merited for them the first grace
ordaining them to consummate glory. This much so far as the efficacy
of merit is concerned. "59
3. The Surd of Reprobation:

If Scotus' emphasis on God's freedom from obligation to creatures (see section
above) and on the irrelevance of evil to His purpose (see section 2 above)
serves to magnify God's generosity towards the elect, it makes reprobation at
best mysterious. According to Scotus, God establishes order on the sin by
punishing it.6() With the elect, punishment is tempered by mitigating mercy61 in
redemption (see section 2.3.2 above). With the reprobate it is eternal: they are
forever given over to their guilt62 and the torment of their inordinate appetites,
depri ved of both natural and supernatural happiness, and made to suffer perpetual
fiery torment, which distracts their intellects so much that they can think of
nothing else.'" For the reprobate, the setting of their finite and temporal acts in
relation to the infinite and eternal God has given their earthly lives eternal
significance. But it does so by serving them a fate as much worse than natural
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animal mortalitY,64 as heavenly bliss is better than natural enjoyments. How can
this piece of doctrine be made to fit with Scotus' general sketch of God's character
and purposes in creation?
(3.1) Justice to Creatures? As Anselm had noted, the justice of one person's
action towards another can be considered three ways: from the angle of the
act-type, from the side of the actor, and from the side of the person acted upon.
Anselm then argued that sins not infinitely culpable so far as the act-type was
concerned, tum out so to be when considered as an offense against an infinitely
worthy ruler. It follows that when God condemns unrepentant sinners to eternal
punishment, His action is fitting because it assigns them their just deserts. 65
Scotus will agree that the fit between sin and reprobation is one of just deserts,
but the claim will not have explanatory value within his theory, given his contention that finite created acts, in and of themselves, have no eternal significance
whatever. That they merit eternal bliss or deserve unending torment, is a product
of God's free and contingent statutes, not of naturalistically grounded claims of
justice. God could have legislated otherwise or not at all (see section 2.3.3
above). Our present question is whether and how the legislation which defines
eternal deserts fits with Scotus' account of God's character and purposes in
creation.
Scotus himself exploits the other side of this coin, maintaining that since God
has no obligations to creatures, He is !lot unjust to them in (a) creating some
persons whom (b) He omits to ordain to glory and (c) omits to furnish with the
graces necessary for perseverance; nor is He unjust (d) in naming the above
torments (instead sayar lighter ones, or annihilation after judgment) as the
penalty for sinning to the end. As Scotus says, "when equals are apprehended,
it [=the highest goodness] wills to share the good unequally and there is no
injustice in this ... because nothing is owed. "06 And he supplements this a
priori consideration with an analogy: a king is not obliged to accept anyone into
the family of his household and may simply accept these and not those, apart
from any injustice. 67
(3.2) God's Justice to Himself Scotus has claimed that God's only obligation
is to His own goodness, that He love it, and that He follow through on what
Love purposes. Within Scotus' framework (which contingently equates God's
justice to Himself with His generosity towards creatures), our question remains,
whether God can be true to Himself, if He weaves the sin of the reprobate into
His cosmic plot by knotting it with eternal punishment? The answer, in my
judgment, is that He cannot.
If, as Scotus' maintains, God's only reason for creating persons is that love
of the infinite good be shared more widely, then Scotus is surely right to insist
that sin and the evils resulting from its punishment are not necessary for this
aim. Even granting that punishment may be rehabilitative for the predestinate,
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it seems obvious that the eternal torment of the reprobate described by Scotus
represents the defeat of God's purpose in those persons. Moreover, it seems to
contradict the love to which God is supposed, above all, to remain true. If Scotus
celebrates the supra-natural divine generosity evidenced in the elevation of the
elect, he refuses to peer down the dark chasm of equally supra-natural divine
cruelty projected in the doom of the damned.
Moreover, these failures look culpable, because seemingly God could have
done otherwise. If the reprobate are neither constituents of or means to His
chosen ends, could He not have planned ahead and not created them in the first
place? or having decided to create them, surely it was within His power to
include them among the predestinate? Are not His omissions horrendous failures
of follow-through?
(3.3) The Excuse of Divine Ignorance? This last objection presupposes that
God had knowledge of which free persons were going to persist in sin and which
ones were not at an instant of nature prior to His decisions about which ones to
create and/or predestine. On Scotus' account (see section 2.3.1 above), this is
not so: God decides to create at nO, to predestine or not at n 1, to distribute grace
or not at n2, to permit sin at n3, and then only at n4 sees which created persons
sin to the end and which do not. Scotus would thus meet my complaint against
God's kindness-that He should have used His knowledge to forestall reprobation-by holding that God does not know "soon" enough, in the natural order
of priorities. 68
Scotus is not clearly entitled to this rejoinder, however, because he sometimes
(although not always 69) holds that God's acts and omissions at nO-n3 are sufficient
for the persistence in sin foreseen at n4. Not that what God does is a total
efficient positive cause of the created volition-since it is impossible, given the
nature of will as a self-determining power for opposites (see section 2.1 above),
for one agent to be the total efficient cause of the volitions of another. 70 Rather
it is His own foreseen non-cooperation with the circumstances that would make
the created volition count as morally good and meritorious that is sufficient for
the created volition being sinfuF' or at least "negatively, not good."72 If God
could have certain foreknowledge of who will sin to the end on the basis of His
own acts, omissions, and permissions at nO-n3, then it would seem that He is
in a position to know the general proposition
(P3) Whomever I pass over and assign no grace will sin to the end, if
I permit it
from the beginning at nO. The objection would then rearise: why did not God
make use of His knowledge of (P3) in deciding whom to create and how to
distribute grace, or to form a policy of predestining and giving grace to everyone
He creates? Or if God permitted any to sin to the end, why did He not use His
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legislative powers to lighten the sanctions and to prolong into purgatory (for as
long as necessary) the opportunities for a favorable response? Why did He not
use His creative imagination to design post-mortem conditions optimal for repentance, while allowing the recalcitrant as much happiness as is metaphysically
compatible with that goal? In not doing so, He seems unfaithful to the general
creative purposes Scotus assigns to Him.
Faced with the dogma of reprobation, Scotus' bottom-line answer is that we
don't know why God creates some whom He omits to predestine, or why He
assigns to the reprobate a punishment so severe; "no reason can be given for
this except the divine will. "n
4. Conclusion:
I will conclude by measuring Scotus' picture of divine goodness in terms of
its power to show the compossibility of God and evil. (4.1) The Resourcefulness
of Scotus' Theory: According to Scotus, God's infinite metaphysical or natural
goodness implies that God has no obligations to creatures to will one thing rather
than another. This consequence erases the question of whether human suffering
and death of the sort found in this world is logically consistent with perfect
divine justice to creatures. The only question of justice left is whether it is
logically possible for such evils to exist in a world in which God is true to
Himself, i.e., "of consistent purpose." According to Scotus, the only necessary
aspect of divine purpose is that He love Himself above all and for His own sake.
So the compossibility of God and evil can be exhibited within Scotus' framework,
if there is some logically possible situation in which God is of consistent purpose
in both (i) loving Himself above all and for His own sake, while (ii) making
created persons and allowing them to sin and suffer temporal evils such as we
experience. A modification of Scotus' soteriological plot-line suggests a story
in which these conditions would be satisfied: viz., one that differs from his actual
proposal, in that God predestines and graces all of the persons He creates; one
in which, should any sin to the point of death, He continues to create post-mortem
opportunities until they repent. Such a world is logically possible even from
Scotus' perspective. Further, it would be one in which God was immeasurably
loving to all created persons, in ordaining them to the supernatural glory of the
beatific vision and love of Himself, as by choosing to use for human redemption
the human soul He loved most and to which He was joined in hypostatic union.
Thus, Scotus' value-theory is resourceful enough to show how (i) and (ii) could
be consistently incorporated in a triumph of divine generosity.
(4.2) Objections to this theory will be many and varied. For now, I shall pause
to clear away two, which do not strike me as decisive. (a) First, some will
contend that the above scenario is not really logically possible, because the
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notions of divine generosity and Incarnation are both contradictory. For generosity
is measured in terms of the resources of the giver; since God's resources are
unlimited, He (like the multi-millionaire) is too rich to be generous. 74 Again. it
seems metaphysically necessary that each individual have one and only one
essential nature; but the Incarnation requires that one person have two.
(b) Further, some will say, that even if divine generosity were logically possible, the above world-story does not cast God as generous, but rather as cruel
and foolish. For, according to Scotus, the sufferings of Christ were not necessary
for our salvation; He could have "let us off' with a simple apology. Is it not
both silly and sadistic of Him to choose the passion and death of His best beloved
creature as a way of redeeming the world? How can He thereby be true to His
own love for the soul of Chrisp75 Moreover, human sufferings in via would limit
God's generosity towards the elect. As neither logically nor metaphysically
necessary for God's intended end, they would serve no purpose and thus have
no meaning. How can He thereby be true to His own putative generosity to
creatures?
(Ra) To the first, Scotus defends the logical and metaphysical possibility of
the Incarnation with a subtle revision of the metaphysics of substance, which I
have elsewhere76 commended as worthy of contemporary consideration. As for
generosity, Scotus might reply, its measures are manifold: e.g., the absolute
size of the gift, its relation to the donor's resources, to the recipient's need or
title thereto, etc. His deepest answer, however, is that it can be generous to give
yourself, no matter how rich in other resources you may be. According to Scotus,
this is exactly what God does in the Incarnation, which is primarily a means to
the end of His love-life with Christ, and secondarily an expression of God's
commitment to the finite and temporal order.
(Rb) Not only that. In the possible world under discussion (like the actual
world, according to Scotus), God does not choose to save us through the pain
and suffering of someone else. Rather, via the Incarnation, God continues to
give Himself, making His own pain and sufferings by which our redemption is
won. Moreover, it is not even metaphysically or logically possible that human
suffering and death limit God's generosity towards the elect, given His sharing
of the intimate love-life of the Trinity, a good incommensurate with temporal
evils. On the contrary, by voluntarily sharing this burden without trying to shirk
it, God's people would likewise participate in His commitment to the finite and
created order.
(4.3) The Inadequacy of Scotus' Actual Account: Scotus' soteriology provides
us with his account of how God is actually solving the problem of evil. As I
have argued (in section 3 above), reprobation is the rock on which the ship of
Scotus' theodicy would founder. For in showing Himself (not unjust) but cruel
to the reprobate, adding "eternal torment" to the sufferings of this present life,"
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God also fails to be true to Himself, to the super-abundant generosity of purpose
that Scotus attributes to Him.
Scotus' options for dealing with the surd of reprobation were severely limited
by the theological climate of his time. The doctrine of reprobation seemed to
have a Biblical base and was for that reason uncontestable. Scotus could have
reverted to Anselmian int1exibility and limited God's justifiable options for
dealing with sin, but this move would have undercut the dramatic (and in my
view, attractive) picture of God's generosity to the elect that is so distinctive of
Scotus' doctrine of the atonement (see section 2.3.2 above). Alternatively, Scotus
could have modified his doctrine of predestination, so that predestination and
reprobation were naturally simultaneous, alike dependent upon and hence naturally posterior to foreseen free choices, thereby eliminating the mind-boggling
thought that a person's eternal destiny might depend on a gratuitous divine
omission. Such doctrines of predestination were espoused by Henry of Ghent
and William Ockham and bring their own difficulties, which I must pass over
here. 77 Not even this step would entirely absolve God of inconstancy of purpose,
however, so long as Scotus continued to insist upon God's freedom to set up
the eternal rewards and penalties any way He wants.
University of California, Los Angeles
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